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The United States has a rich legal history addressing how to apportion
responsibility between multiple negligent actors, generating legal
doctrine including contributory negligence and comparative negligence.
Under these doctrine, the trier-of-fact—most often a jury—is
responsible for apportioning responsibility for the harm. This Article
examines how jurors approach complex negligent tort cases in which
responsibility can be attributed to multiple negligent actors including a
negligent plaintiff. In an empirical study participants read a negligent
tort vignette about a car accident and then apportioned responsibility
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between the defendant, plaintiff, and other external factors. The
findings indicated that participants’ apportionments of responsibility to
the defendant varied widely. Some of the variability is explained by
individual differences in attributional tendencies—the extent to which
an individual attributes the behavior of another to that individual’s
disposition or the situational factors surrounding that behavior. The
findings also highlighted the influence of human cognition on the
apportionment of responsibility. Participants preferred apportionment
values that were multiples of ten (on a zero to one hundred percent
scale). These findings could have profound implications for the
distinction between the forty-nine percent and fifty percent rules
associated with modified comparative negligence.
INTRODUCTION
In negligence cases, some determinations of responsibility are
straightforward, but many are not. For example, suppose Beth
swerves her truck in and out of vehicles attempting to dodge rush
hour traffic.1  While changing lanes abruptly, Beth ignores the traffic
signal, runs a red light, and crashes into the side of Anne’s car as
Anne appropriately begins rolling through the intersection upon see-
ing a green signal. Anne is ejected from the car resulting in severe
injuries. These facts suggest that Beth is responsible for the harm to
Anne. If she had appropriately stopped at the red light, her truck
would not have crashed into Anne’s car.
Although the first version of this scenario implies relatively straight-
forward responsibility, additional considerations can complicate the
scenario making determinations of responsibility less straightforward.
An alternative version could expose that Anne was not wearing her
seat belt. Now, Anne’s actions have likely contributed to her harm.
Had she been wearing a seat belt, she might not have been ejected
from the car and her injuries would likely have been less severe. In
most jurisdictions, a trier-of-fact must now also determine if Anne’s
actions—in addition to the defendant’s—were negligent, and the ex-
tent to which they contributed to her harm.2
Beyond the actions of Beth and Anne, there might also be other
contributing factors—including the actions of other people—outside
of either Beth or Anne’s control. For example, in yet another version
of the scenario, the manufacturer of Beth’s truck might have installed
1. This example is loosely based on RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF
LIABILITY § 3 cmt. b, illus. 3 (AM. LAW. INST. 2000).
2. Assuming this jurisdiction does not maintain a seat belt statute precluding recovery.
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a faulty brake system, contributing to Beth’s inability to stop quickly
even if she had noticed the red light last minute and attempted to
stop. Or, bad weather—such as black ice in the intersection—might
offer further complications. A myriad of possible versions of this sce-
nario involving the addition of multiple negligent individuals and com-
plicating circumstances add to the difficulty of determining
responsibility. And these complications are often evidenced in real
cases, not just hypotheticals.
The trier-of-fact often has the unenviable task of sorting through
these complicated factors to determine responsibility. Sometimes, this
means apportioning legal responsibility between the plaintiff and de-
fendant (or multiple defendants). The legal system has implemented
an array of doctrines and rules for determining legal responsibility
when multiple actors contribute to the harm through their negligent
actions—including contributory negligence and comparative negli-
gence. According to the strict common law doctrine of contributory
negligence, a plaintiff would be barred from recovery if she3 contrib-
uted in any amount to her own injuries.4 Comparative negligence, in
contrast, still allows a plaintiff to recover even when she contributed
to her own harm.5 This rule asks the trier-of-fact to assign responsibil-
ity in proportion to the parties’, and any other relevant persons’,
wrongful conduct that caused the injury.6
Although these rules govern the implications of various apportion-
ments of responsibility (e.g., what happens when the plaintiff is more
responsible than the defendant), they do not offer the trier-of-fact gui-
dance on how to actually apportion responsibility. Instead, they rely
on subjective determinations of fault by the trier-of-fact. Thus, to fully
understand the application of the legal doctrines and rules, it is neces-
sary to evaluate the impact of human psychology. In this Article, I ask
the following questions: In complex negligent tort cases in which re-
sponsibility can be attributed to multiple causal influences (including
the plaintiff’s own negligence), how does the trier-of-fact make judg-
ments regarding responsibility? Additionally, are decision makers uni-
form in how they judge the same case? 
This Article will examine how the trier-of-fact—often jurors—ap-
proaches apportioning responsibility. The Article will begin by re-
3. I will use the pronouns “she” and “her” instead of “he or she” and “him or her” for simplic-
ity when a specific gender is not otherwise specified.
4. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ WITH EVELYN F. ROWE, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 1.02, at 5
(5th ed. 2010); Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809).
5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 8 cmt. a (AM. LAW.
INST. 2000).
6. Id.
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viewing the legal doctrine associated with apportioning liability. Then,
it will discuss the importance of the jury in making these determina-
tions. Next, the Article will discuss social psychological literature con-
cerning social attributions, which suggests there may be variability in
how individual jurors approach apportioning responsibility. Finally,
the majority of the Article is spent discussing the current study, which
examines how participants apportion responsibility. This is done with
a focus on assessing variability in perceptions and a discussion of the
implications of these findings.
I. APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY
A. Contributory Negligence
The common law doctrine of contributory negligence governs a
plaintiff’s ability to recover when their own negligence is a contribut-
ing factor to their harm.7 The doctrine’s origins can be traced back to
the 1809 English case Butterfield v. Forrester.8 This “principal author-
ity” on contributory negligence determined that even if a defendant is
found negligent, a plaintiff who contributes to their harm cannot re-
cover damages.9 Citing Butterfield v. Forrester,10 American jurispru-
dence adopted contributory negligence in 1824 in Smith v. Smith11
(Massachusetts) and Washburn v. Tracy12 (Vermont).13 The Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts further codified the rule that a plaintiff’s negli-
gence was an absolute bar on recovery.14 If a plaintiff’s negligent
behavior contributed in any degree to their own harm—even just one
percent—she would be unable to recover any proportion of her dam-
ages from the defendant.15 The doctrine acts as a complete defense
7. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 1.02, at 5.
8. Butterfield, 103 Eng. Rep. at 926; SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 1.02, at 5.
9. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 1.02, at 5.
10. 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926, 927 (1809); SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 1.02, at 5.
11. 19 Mass. 621, 664 (1824) (concluding “that this action cannot be maintained, unless the
plaintiff can show that he used ordinary care; for without that, it is by no means certain that he
himself was not the cause of his own injury.”).
12. 2 D.Chip. 128, *1 (1824) (determining that “if it appear that the injury complained of
would not have happened, but for a want of ordinary care and diligence in the plaintiff, the
plaintiff is not entitled to recover.”).
13. Peter Nash Swisher, Virginia Should Abolish The Archaic Tort Defense of Contributory
Negligence and Adopt a Comparative Negligence Defense in Its Place, 46 U. RICHMOND L. REV.
359, 361 (2011).
14. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY intro., at 3 (AM.
LAW. INST. 2000).
15. Id.
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even in cases where the defendant’s negligence greatly outweighs the
plaintiff’s contribution to their own harm.16
Although once widely accepted17, the doctrine of contributory neg-
ligence has been greatly criticized. One criticism is that the rule lacked
satisfactory reasoning or justification for its extremely harsh stance
against plaintiffs whose negligence contributes only minimally to the
harm.18 The doctrine had the effect of “strongly deterring plaintiffs
who might act unreasonably while eliminating any deterrence of negli-
gent defendants . . . .”19 However, no reason was provided for why a
plaintiff’s negligence should be more strongly deterred than a defen-
dant’s. Further, it seemed to go against the principle tenets of tort law
focused on deterring defendant negligence and accountability for
harm to others.20 As articulated by Professor Dan B. Dobbs:
[This] rule was extreme. The plaintiff who was guilty of only slight
or trivial negligence was barred completely, even if the defendant
was guilty of quite serious negligence, as contemporary courts have
had occasion to observe in criticizing the rule. The traditional con-
tributory negligence rule was extreme not merely in results but in
principle. No satisfactory reasoning has ever explained the rule. It
departed seriously from ideals of accountability and deterrence [in
tort law] because it completely relieved the defendant from liability
even if he was by far the most negligent actor. A regime of account-
ability would, in contrast, hold the defendant liability for a propor-
tionate share of the harm [under the doctrine of comparative
negligence].21
A second criticism of contributory negligence suggests that it is un-
predictable in how it is applied.22 The logic suggesting unpredictability
is as follows: The trier-of-fact is asked to categorically determine
whether the plaintiff and defendant is negligent or not.23 If the plain-
tiff is negligent, then recovery is barred. This categorical (yes or no)
determination fails to appropriately represent the often nuanced and
complex causes of the harm.24 By precluding recovery for even the
slightest contributory negligence by the plaintiff, some triers-of-fact
16. Swisher, supra note 13, at 359.
17. Arthur Best, Impediments to Reasonable Tort Reform: Lessons from the Adoption of
Comparative Negligence, 40 IND. L. REV. 1, 1 (2007) (noting forty-four states applied contribu-
tory negligence during “an ‘avalanche’ of tort reform”).
18. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 1.02, at 5–6; Best, supra note 17, at 4 n.19.
19. Best, supra note 17, at 4.
20. Swisher, supra note 13, at 360.
21. Id. (quoting DAN B DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 199, at 494–95 (2000)).
22. Best, supra note 17, at 4.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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find their hands legally tied to an outcome they find unsatisfactory.25
To reach an intuitively satisfactory outcome, a trier-of-fact might be
tempted into concluding a plaintiff was not negligent, even when they
actually believe the plaintiff’s negligence contributed to the harm.26
Although this is a failure to apply the law, it arguably satisfies a trier-
of-fact’s desire for fairness and compensates for the failures associated
with the doctrine of contributory negligence. However, without an
empirical examination of the trier-of-fact’s decision-making process,
the extent to which triers-of-fact are taking matters into their own
hands is unknown. But, if this is occurring in some cases, then there is
ample potential for variable application of the doctrine leading to un-
predictability in case outcomes.
B. Comparative Negligence
The legal concept of comparative negligence emerged as an alterna-
tive to contributory negligence in the early-twentieth century. Peter
Nash Swisher attributes the first United States articulation of the con-
cept to Chalmers Mole and Lyman Wilson’s 1932 law review article.27
In a period of intense tort reform, most states legislatively replaced
the common law doctrine of contributory negligence with comparative
negligence.28 The theory of comparative negligence emerged from ad-
miralty law and the Federal Employers’ Liability Act.29 According to
the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, an interstate railroad employee
would not be barred from recovering damages from her employer be-
cause of contributory negligence.30 Instead, the plaintiff’s damage
award would be diminished in proportion to her negligent contribu-
tion to the harm.31 In the period of 1969 through 1984, thirty-seven
states adopted comparative negligence as an alternative to contribu-
tory negligence.32 Now, only four states—Alabama, Maryland, North
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Swisher, supra note 13, at 364 n.28 (citing A. Chalmers Mole & Lyman P. Wilson, A Study
of Comparative Negligence, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 333 (1932)).
28. Best, supra note 17, at 1; SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 1.04, at 12. This reform occurred
through both judicial and legislative reform. However, in most states reformed was legislatively
driven.
29. Swisher, supra note 13, at 365.
30. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 1.04(a), at 12–13.
31. Id. § 1.04(a), at 13.
32. Best, supra note 17, at 6. As detailed by Best, during this time (1969-1984) the adoption of
comparative negligence was either through the court or legislature and could consist of a “pure”
or “modified” form. The majority of states that adopted comparative negligence adopted a
“modified” version through legislative enactment.
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Carolina, and Virginia—and the District of Columbia maintain the
doctrine of contributory negligence.33
Comparative negligence is a doctrine that apportions the cost of an
accident on the basis of the relative fault of all parties.34 Although the
doctrine refers to a comparison of fault between the plaintiff and the
defendant, within the United States comparative negligence generally
involves the division of damages between the plaintiff and
defendant.35
Comparative negligence encompasses two broad formulations of
the doctrine: (1) pure comparative negligence and (2) modified com-
parative negligence.36 Pure comparative negligence allows a plaintiff
to recover no matter the proportion of her negligence, even if it is
greater than the defendant’s negligence.37 Under this formulation, no
plaintiff is barred from recovery because of her own negligence.38 The
plaintiff’s damages are simply reduced in proportion to her contribu-
tion to the harm.39 If the trier-of-fact determines the plaintiff is re-
sponsible for sixteen percent of the harm, then the plaintiff can
recover eighty-four percent of the damages from the defendant. Simi-
larly, even if the plaintiff is responsible for the majority of the harm,
sixty-three percent, she can still recover thirty-seven percent of the
damages from the defendant. It is inconsequential that the plaintiff is
primarily responsible for the harm. Pure comparative negligence has
been adopted in twelve states including Alaska, Arizona, California,
Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico,
New York, Rhode Island, and Washington.40
Under the doctrine of modified comparative negligence, if the
plaintiff’s negligence reaches a certain threshold, she is barred from
recovery.41 There are three versions of modified comparative negli-
gence each setting a different threshold.42 Under the “forty-nine per-
cent rule,” if a plaintiff’s negligence is less than that of the
defendant—forty-nine percent or less—then the damage award is re-
33. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 1.01, at 3–4. Upon my review in April 2019, Alabama, Mary-
land, North Carolina, Virginia, and the District of Columbia still maintained the doctrine of
contributory negligence in some form. See app’x tbl.1.
34. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 2.01, at 32.
35. Id. (noting that some suggest the doctrine of comparative negligence may be more appro-
priately referred to as “damage apportionment” or “comparative damages.”).
36. Id. § 2.01(a), at 32.
37. Id. § 2.01(a), at 33.
38. Swisher, supra note 13, at 365.
39. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 2.01, at 33.
40. See app’x tbl.2.
41. See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 2.01(b)(3), at 33–34.
42. Id. § 2.01(b)(3), at 34.
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duced by the percentage of the plaintiff’s fault.43 However, if the
plaintiff’s negligence is at fault for fifty percent or more of the harm—
equal to or greater than the defendant’s fault—then the plaintiff is
barred from recovering damages.44 This rule has been adopted in ten
states including Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Maine,
Nebraska, North Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah.45
A second variant of this rule—the “fifty percent rule”—allows the
plaintiff to recover if her proportion of fault is equal to or less than
the defendant’s fault.46 But, the plaintiff cannot recover damages if
her proportion of harm crosses beyond the fifty percent threshold.47
The difference between this and the forty-nine percent rule is a mere
one percent, but occurs at a theoretically and logically crucial dividing
line: the fifty/fifty point. The difference between these rules hinges on
whether a plaintiff can recover when her proportion of negligence is
the same as the defendant’s negligence or if the plaintiff’s negligence
must be less than the defendant’s negligence. The majority of states
have adopted the fifty percent rule including: Connecticut, Delaware,
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, West Vir-
ginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.48
The final variant of modified comparative negligence is only used
by one state: South Dakota.49 This version of the rule focuses on com-
paring the plaintiff’s negligence to the defendant’s negligence.50 If by
comparison “a plaintiff’s negligence is slight and the defendant’s is
gross” then “the plaintiff can recover” damages.51 However, as with
the other variants of comparative negligence, those damages are re-
duced by the percentage of fault attributed to the plaintiff.52
II. MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS AND DISTRIBUTING DAMAGES
This Article has focused on apportioning responsibility for harm
when the plaintiff and a single defendant are both negligent. As de-
scribed in the Introduction of this Article, however, it is possible for
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See app’x tbl.3.
46. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 2.01(b)(3), at 34.
47. Id.
48. See app’x tbl.4.
49. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 2.01(b)(2), at 33.
50. Id. § 2.01(b)(3), at 33. See app’x tbl.5.
51. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 2.01(b)(3), at 33.
52. Id.
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there to be multiple tortfeasors—whether named defendants or not.
The comparative negligence of the plaintiff determines the amount by
which the damage award is reduced because of the plaintiff’s fault.
This is a reduction of the overall amount that the plaintiff can recover
for her harm. This Part will briefly consider the doctrine governing the
division of responsibility between multiple tortfeasors and the conse-
quential division of damages.
The doctrine of joint tortfeasors allows for the joinder of multiple
defendants into one lawsuit if any of the defendants’ actions “made a
substantial contribution to the cause of a single, indivisible injury.”53
This avoids the complication of multiple lawsuits, while allowing the
negligence to be apportioned between multiple defendants.54 Thus, in
a comparative negligence jurisdiction, the trier-of-fact may be asked
to apportion negligence between the plaintiff and multiple defendants.
How are damages divided when there are multiple tortfeasors?
Under the old common law rule of joint and several liability, every
defendant who had a part in causing the harm to the plaintiff is re-
sponsible for the full amount of the damages.55 As described by the
United States Supreme Court in 1933, “The rule is settled by innumer-
able authorities that if, injury be caused by the concurring negligence
of the defendant and a third person, the defendant is liable to the
same extent as though it had been caused by his negligence alone.”56
Under this doctrine, a plaintiff could bring a claim against only one of
her tortfeasors and collect all of her damages, regardless of how small
that defendant’s contribution to the harm. Recent trends have in-
cluded a movement away from joint and several liability in multiple
states.57 These states tend to adopt a system of several liability, where
defendants are only responsible for their corresponding proportion of
damages.58
III. THE ROLE OF THE JURY
The trier-of-fact, most often a jury, is a cornerstone of the civil jus-
tice system.59 Either litigant may request a jury to determine negli-
53. Id. § 15.03, at 332.
54. Id. § 15.02, at 332.
55. Id. § 15.03, at 332–33.
56. Miller v. Union Pacific R. Co., 290 U.S. 227, 236 (1933).
57. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 15.04, at 334.
58. Id. § 15.04, at 334–35.
59. Lawrence M. Friedman, Some Notes on the Civil Jury in Historical Perspective, 48
DEPAUL L. REV. 201, 203 (1998).
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gence.60 The role of the jury is especially influential in negligent tort
cases because it is responsible for evaluating the appropriateness of
the parties’ actions in addition to deciding the facts of the case.61 With
regard to comparative negligence, courts have been reluctant to alter
the apportionment of negligence between the parties.62 For example,
the Supreme Court of Minnesota stated, “Upon a review of a jury’s
apportionment of negligence between tortfeasors . . . we will not sub-
stitute our judgment for that of the jury unless there is no evidence
reasonably tending to sustain the apportionment or the apportion-
ment is manifestly and palpably against the weight of the evidence.”63
Considering the important role the trier-of-fact plays in apportion-
ing responsibility and the courts’ reluctance to alter that apportion-
ment, it is crucial to understand how juries are going about dividing
responsibility. Arguably, the best way to understand how juries apply
legal standards is by examining existing social science research and
conducting further studies. This Article examines how human psychol-
ogy influences apportionments of responsibility using a negligent tort
scenario. The following Section reviews the pertinent literature con-
cerning the psychology of attribution and discusses how that psychol-
ogy might influence apportionments of responsibility.
IV. PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTRIBUTION
Research at the intersection of law and psychology provides invalu-
able information regarding the psychology of juries.64 Despite the fact
that individual jurors are present for the same trial and listen to the
same evidence, they rarely agree when taking their initial vote.65 This
suggests there are pre-existing differences between jurors that influ-
ence their assessments of a case.66 Although some variability is likely
attributable to personal beliefs, there might also be systematic differ-
ences associated with cultural backgrounds and demographic features
that impact an individual’s cognitive tendencies.67 For the purposes of
60. Steven Hetcher, The Jury’s Out: Social Norms’ Misunderstood Role in Negligence Law, 91
GEO. L.J. 633, 633 (2003).
61. Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A. Wendt, What Judges Tell Juries About Negligence: A Review
of Pattern Jury Instructions, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 587, 590 (2001).
62. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 18.01, at 410.
63. Martin v. Bussert, 193 N.W.2d 134, 139 (1971).
64. See generally BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN, THE JURY UNDER FIRE: MYTH, CONTROVERSY, AND
REFORM (2017).
65. Shari Diamond, Scientific Jury Selection: What Social Scientists Know and Do Not Know,
73 JUDICATURE 178, 178 (1990).
66. Id.
67. See generally id.
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understanding how a trier-of-fact might apportion responsibility, it is
useful to consider how ordinary people interpret the actions of others.
Social psychologists have long been concerned with how laypeople,
as “naı¨ve psychologists,” navigate the related tasks of forming causal
judgments and making social inferences.68 Causal judgments involve
the observer (juror) identifying the causal agent—or agents—to attri-
bute the outcome (the harm).69 Most theories of attribution recognize
a distinction between the internal, or dispositional, nature of the actor
(e.g., abilities, traits, or motives) and the external, or situational, influ-
ences (e.g., task difficulties, incentives, or peer pressures).70 Early re-
search on attributional tendencies suggested that people tend to
attribute more causal influence to dispositional factors, and they infer
attributes about an individual despite the situational influences on his
or her behavior.71 These effects were labeled the fundamental attribu-
tion error—defined as “the tendency for attributors to underestimate
the impact of situational factors and to overestimate the role of dispo-
sitional factors in controlling behavior.”72
Gu¨nter Bierbrauer demonstrated the fundamental attribution error
by examining participants’ impressions of the influences operating in
the classic Milgram situation.73 Participants viewed a realistic Milgram
study reenactment (using verbatim dialog) of a “Teacher’s” obedience
to an authority figure directing them to shock the “Learner” to the
point of delivering the maximum shock (the “Learner” was really a
confederate that was not actually being shocked).74 There were differ-
ent conditions in which the participants played the role of the
“Teacher” in the reenactment or merely observed the reenactment.75
Regardless, participants underestimated the influence of the situa-
tional forces that compelled obedience from the “Teacher” in the re-
enactment.76 Participants demonstrated the fundamental attribution
error by tending to assume that the obedience reflected something
about the “Teacher’s” character.77
68. Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution
Process, 10 SCI. DIRECT 174, 175 (1977), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0-
065260108603573.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 175–76.
71. Id. at 179
72. Id. at 183.
73. Id. at 184–85.
74. Ross, supra note 68, at 184–85.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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According to the fundamental attribution error, an observer is
likely to be dispositionally focused and will likely underestimate the
effect of situational influences on a defendant’s behavior. For exam-
ple, when observing another individual driving over the speed limit
the observer will make an internal inference about that person’s char-
acter. This observer is more likely to assume the speeding driver is
reckless or ascribe some other negative trait to that individual. This
emphasis on internal attributions could lead to an increased sense of
agency over outcomes of actions, including outcomes that lead to
harm to others.
This over emphasis on dispositional explanations of behavior was
once thought to be universal. However, more recent research suggests
that attributional tendencies actually vary between cultures and indi-
viduals. For example, holistic cultures, such as East Asia, tend to per-
ceive the situation as having a stronger influence on an individual’s
actions compared to analytic cultures, such as the United States.78
Stated another way, individuals from holistic cultures tend to make
more situational attributions—they are more likely to see the situa-
tion as a cause of someone’s behavior.79 For example, if someone from
a holistic culture sees another person driving over the speed limit, she
is likely to consider the possible situational factors that could influ-
ence that behavior rather than automatically make an assumption
about that person’s character or disposition. A holistic individual
might consider that the speeding driver is late for work or may be
trying to get to the hospital because of a medical emergency.
Michael W. Morris and Kaiping Peng demonstrated that the holistic
culture’s tendency to make situational attributions even extended to
attributions for murders.80 Their study had Chinese and American
participants weigh the importance of potential causes for two different
murders that had occurred.81 Overall, the findings indicated that com-
pared to Americans the Chinese participants gave more weight to sit-
78. Michael W. Morris & Kaiping Peng, Culture and Cause: American and Chinese Attribu-
tions for Social and Physical Events, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 949, 949 (1994).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 962.
81. Id. at 963. The materials described two mass murders. Id. at 958. The first was committed
by Gang Lu who was a Chinese physics student who had lost an award which he unsuccessfully
appealed. Id. He ended up going to the University of Iowa Physics Department and “shot his
advisor, the person who handled his appeal, several fellow students and bystanders, and then
himself.” Id. The second mass murder was committed by Thomas McIlvane, who was an “Irish-
American postal worker who had recently lost his job.” Id. He had appealed the decision but
was unsuccessful. Id. He ended up going to the Post Office where he had previously worked,
“shot his supervisor, the person who handled his appeal, several fellow workers and bystanders,
and then himself.” Id.
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uational factors that influenced the murder, such as corruption by
others who were bad examples and life disruptions experienced by
each of the murderers.82 If Chinese participants attribute more causal
influence to the situation then this could imply that they ascribe less
responsibility to “bad actors” compared to American participants.
Although differences in attributional tendencies were initially stud-
ied in cross-cultural settings, additional research has observed that so-
cioeconomic status also influences attributional tendencies. For
example, researchers found that lower social class participants in both
the United States and Russia are more situational and less disposi-
tional in their attributional tendencies.83 Igor Grossmann and Michael
E.W. Varnum examined the influence of socioeconomic status in addi-
tion to nationality differences between Americans and Russians.84
Participants were asked to read vignettes which described a protago-
nist who performed either a desirable or undesirable action, and then
they rated the extent to which they thought internal and external fac-
tors influenced the protagonist’s actions.85 As predicted, they found
that, overall, Russians made less dispositional attributions than Amer-
icans.86 However, they also found that above and beyond the effect of
nationality, lower social class participants made less dispositional and
more situational attributions than those from higher social classes.87
These findings indicate that groups with different socioeconomic sta-
tuses also show cultural differences in attributional tendencies.88 My
previous research has also demonstrated differences in attributional
tendencies as a measurable individual difference within United
States.89
V. CURRENT STUDY: DIVIDING RESPONSIBILITY
The purpose of the current study is to examine how jurors approach
complex negligent tort cases in which responsibility can potentially be
attributed to multiple factors including the negligent behavior of the
person injured. More specifically, the driving questions include: “How
82. Id. at 964.
83. See generally Igor Grossmann & Michael E.W. Varnum, Social Class, Culture, and Cogni-
tion, 2 SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 81 (2011).
84. Id. at 81.
85. Id. at 83.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 86.
89. See generally Ashley M. Votruba, Partition Responsibility: The Influence of Cultural Dif-
ferences in Social Attributions on Jurors’ Division of Responsibility in a Negligent Tort Context
(May 2017) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Arizona State University), https://reposi-
tory.asu.edu/items/44295.
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does the trier-of-fact perceive and make judgments regarding appor-
tionments of responsibility when there are multiple causal influ-
ences?”; and “Are decision-makers uniform in how they judge the
same case?” Based on the social psychological literature surrounding
attributional tendencies, I predict that jurors will vary in their assess-
ments of the apportionment of responsibility. Further, I predict that
this variable will be driven, in part, by individual differences in at-
tributional tendencies. Individuals who are more disposition-focused
and less situation-focused will apportion more responsibility to the
identified defendant resulting in less responsibility being attributed to
other factors. The paradigm used to examine these questions consists
of a short vignette involving a car accident with multiple contributing
factors, including negligence on the part of the plaintiff and the
defendant.
A.  Participants
Two hundred ten participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk90
completed the study, and they were compensated $0.50 for their time.
Participants were required to be an adult within the United States. No
other requirements were specified; the goal was to sample broadly
from the United States population. The average age of the partici-
pants was 38.61 years old, with a range from 19 to 84 years old (SD =
13.13 years). The sample consisted of slightly more female than male
participants: 52.4% self-designated as female and 42.9% self-desig-
nated as male (the remainder opted to not disclose their gender). With
regards to the ethnic breakdown, this sample primarily identified as
“White/Caucasian” (75.7%), with 10.0% of the sample identifying as
“Black/African-American” and 3.3% identifying as “Hispanic/La-
tino”. Additional demographic information is reported in Table 6.
90. Amazon Mechanical Turk is a crowdsourcing marketplace for individuals and businesses.
AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://www.mturk.com/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
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TABLE 6. Participants’ Demographic Information &
Study Design Distribution
# of Percent (%) of
Variable/ Response Option Participants Participants
Gender
Female 110 52.4
Male 90 42.9
Did not report gender 10 4.8
Ethnicity
White/Caucasian/European 159 75.7
Black/African-American 21 10.0
Hispanic/Latino/Chicano 7 3.3
East Asian/Southeast Asian/Asian-
American 2 2.9
European or Australian 1 0.5
Other 4 1.9
Did not report ethnicity 10 4.8
Political Affiliation
Democrat 86 41.0
Republican 50 23.8
Libertarian 4 1.9
Independent 60 28.6
Did not report political affiliation 10 4.8
Self-reported Social Class
Working class 35 16.7
lower-middle class 55 26.2
Middle class 91 43.3
Upper-middle class 17 8.1
Upper class 1 0.5
Did not report social class 11 5.2
B. Methods
The study was administered online through Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk using Qualtrics survey software.91 After consenting to participate
in the study, the participants were directed to read a short scenario
and were then provided the following car accident vignette:
It is early in the morning and Rick is speeding on a mostly empty
two-lane road. The road is wet, and a dense fog has settled upon it.
Up the road, a city bus has run out of gas and the bus driver has
attempted to pull over to the shoulder. The bus, however, is still
slightly blocking the roadway. Rick’s car hits the bus.
After reading the vignette, participants were asked, “To what extent
do you believe each of the following factors should be considered re-
91. Qualtrics is a survey tool built for multiple uses including market research. QUALTRICS
XM, https://www.qualtrics.com/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
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sponsible for the accident? Please provide the percentage (%) of re-
sponsibility for each factor, totaling to 100%.” Then they assigned a
percentage (totaling 100%) to each of the following factors: (1) Rick’s
driving; (2) the road and weather conditions; (3) the bus partially
blocking the roadway; (4) luck; and (5) other. Pilot testing and infor-
mal focus groups regarding the study materials suggested that these
were the factors that lay perceivers tended to attribute responsibility
for the harm. Participants had the option to designate a factor as “0”
percent responsible if they felt it was not an influential factor.
Following the apportionment of responsibility, participants were in-
structed on negligence: “Negligence is the failure to use reasonable
care. Negligence may consist of action or inaction. Negligence is the
failure to act as a reasonably careful person would act under the cir-
cumstances.” They were then asked whether Rick was negligent (re-
sponding “yes” or “no”). Finally, the last question about the case
explained several liability and described the damages from the acci-
dent as being worth about $100,000. The prompt stated:
According to some state’s negligent tort laws, a person is only le-
gally responsible for the amount of damages that their proportion of
the harm caused. This means that they only have to pay for the pro-
portion of the damages that they are responsible for causing. As-
sume this is the law and that the damages in this case were $100,000.
How much of the $100,000 in damages should Rick have to pay?
Following this prompt, participants responded to the question: “How
much of the $100,000 in damages should Rick have to pay?” By in-
structing participants on several liability and providing the total
amount of damages it is possible to compare apportionment of re-
sponsibility with lay perceptions of damage awards.
After completing the questions regarding the car accident, partici-
pants were given the Attributional Tendency Scale. This scale consists
of six statements that participants were asked to rate their agreement
with on a scale of 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”).
Items included: “How people behave is mostly determined by their
personality” and “People in similar situations will behave similarly re-
gardless of their personalities” (see Table 8 for the full list of items).
Finally, participants answered several demographic questions, were
debriefed on the study’s purpose, and were provided an individualized
survey code that allowed them to receive payment through Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk for completing the study.
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C. Results
1. Perceptions of Negligence
As written, the vignette suggests negligence on the part of our de-
fendant, Rick, because he was speeding.92 However, although in-
structed on the general concept of negligence, not all of the
participants believed Rick was actually negligent. Of the participants
who responded, 82.5% believed the defendant was negligent, while
17.5% did not believe Rick’s actions were negligent. If the participant
did not believe that the defendant’s actions were negligent, then there
is no reason to assess how they apportion responsibility for the harm.
Therefore, the results regarding apportionment of responsibility are
reported for 82.5% of the participants who believed the defendant
was negligent.
2. Apportionment of Responsibility
The following results describe how 82.5% of the participants—those
who believed the defendant was negligent—apportioned responsibil-
ity between the five options of: (1) Rick’s driving; (2) the road and
weather conditions; (3) the bus partially blocking the roadway; (4)
luck; and (5) other. Table 7 below provides the mean, standard devia-
tion, minimum value, and maximum value for each of the options.
TABLE 7. Descriptive Statistics for Apportionments
of Responsibility
Rick’s Road and Bus Blocking
Driving Weather Road Luck Other
Mean 63.33 14.93 16.99 2.63 1.53
Standard Deviation 26.66 14.51 16.80 6.24 5.63
Minimum Value 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum Value 100 70 80 40 40
On average, the participants apportioned 63.33% of the responsibility
to the defendant. The majority of the remaining apportionment of
responsibility was spread almost evenly between “the road and
weather conditions” (14.93%) and “the bus partially blocking the
roadway” (16.99%; this represents the contributory negligence of the
92. In most jurisdictions, speeding is considered negligence per se. In this hypothetical set up
for research purposes, that is not the case. Participants were not instructed that by “speeding”
the defendant had broken a statute establishing a duty of care indicating that this is negligence
per se. Instead, the participants were instructed to treat this as a standard negligence claim.
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bus driver). Very little responsibility was apportioned to “luck”
(2.63%) or other factors (1.53%).
An examination of the frequency distribution of this data (see
Figure 1) highlights a couple of key findings. First, although all of
these participants believed the defendant was negligent, the amount
of responsibility they apportioned to the defendant varied widely. This
is evident by the distribution of 26.1% of the participants apportioning
less than 50% to the defendant, 15.8% apportioning exactly 50%, and
58.1% apportioning over 50%. This high level of variability is also
highlighted by the large standard deviation for apportionments of the
defendant’s responsibility (standard deviation = 26.66%). Although
there is considerable variability, the majority of participants (73.9%)
believed that the defendant was at least 50% to blame for the harm.
FIGURE 1. Frequency Distribution of the Proportion of
Responsibility Assigned to the Defendant
Frequency of Percent (%) of Responsibility
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There is one other feature of the frequency distribution that is
worth noting given the distinction between the forty-nine percent and
fifty percent rules of comparative negligence. Of the 165 participants
in this analysis, the overwhelming majority apportioned responsibility
to the defendant on a value that is a multiple of 10 (e.g., 10, 20, 30,
etc.). Only 35 participants (21.2%) chose a value that was not a multi-
ple of 10. And of those, the majority (29) chose values that were a
multiple of 5.
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3. The Influence of Attributional Tendencies on the Apportionment
of Responsibility
As previously discussed, an individual’s attributional tendencies in-
fluence perceptions of causal influences. Thus, I predict that an indi-
vidual’s predisposition to be dispositionally or situationally focused
influenced their apportionment of responsibility to the defendant.
Participants who are more dispositionally focused should see stronger
causal connections between the defendant’s actions and the harm.
Thus, they will apportion a larger percent of the responsibility for the
harm to the defendant. In contrast, participants who are more situa-
tionally focused should see a stronger influence of external, situational
factors. Thus, they will apportion a smaller percent of the responsibil-
ity for the harm to the defendant.
To examine the effect of individual differences in attributional ten-
dencies, I have developed and validated the Attributional Tendencies
Scale.93 To test the factor structure of the items of the Attributional
Tendency Scale in this sample, I conducted an exploratory factor anal-
ysis (EFA) on the six items using Principal Axis Factoring to deter-
mine whether the scale is unidimensional as predicted. A Direct
Oblimin rotation was used, allowing the factors to correlate. The anal-
ysis extracted two initial factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1: The
first factor explained 39.17% of the variance (eigenvalue = 2.35) and
the second explained 27.28% of the variance (eigenvalue = 1.64). Ta-
ble 8 displays the factor loadings from the Pattern Matrix of each item
on the two extracted factors. The first factor contained the three situa-
tionally focused items loading positively, with all loadings over 0.75.
None of the dispositionally focused items loaded with a value of
greater than +/- 0.20. The second factor consisted of all three disposi-
tionally focused items loading positively, all with loadings over 0.75.
93. Ashley M. Votruba, Attributional tendencies: An examination of the relationship between
dispositional and situational tendencies using a self-report scale (Dec. 4, 2019) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
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TABLE 8. Exploratory Factor Analysis factor loadings for the
Attributional Tendency Scale
Subscale/Item Factor 1 Factor 2
Dispositional Tendency Subscale
1) How people behave is mostly determined by their -.034 .786
personality.
2) An individual’s personality predisposes them to act in -.066 .832
specific ways.
3) An individual’s future behavior is predictable if you know .120 .776
his or her personality.
Situational Tendency Subscale
4) Behavior can best be predicted by looking at situational .789 .184
factors.
5) Behavior is primarily determined by the situations people .827 -.020
find themselves in.
6) Situational influences often have a large influence on .829 -.116
someone’s behavior.
Note. Factor loadings > +/- .30 are in boldface. The exploratory factor analysis
was done using Principal Axis Factoring with a Direct Oblimin rotation allowing
the factors to correlate.
In addition to the exploratory analyses, I conducted a two-factor
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) on the data, using maximum
likelihood as the estimation procedure. To test the fit of the data, I
examined the Chi-Square Test of Model Fit, for which values closer to
zero indicate a better fit. I also examined two other model fit indices
that are not influenced by sample size and have different
measurement properties: the comparative fit index (CFI) and the
root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA).94 The CFI
compares the fit of the estimated model to the fit of the independence
model (where all variables are unrelated) using a noncentral c2
distribution; possible values range from 0–1, with larger numbers
indicating better model fit. A CFI of .90 or greater is generally
thought to indicate good fit of the model to the data, with values
greater than .95 indicating excellent fit. I also examined the RMSEA
which compares the estimated model to a perfect (i.e., saturated)
model. Smaller RMSEA values represent better fitting models and
values between .06 and .10 are generally thought to indicate a
reasonable degree of fit, with values less than .06 indicating very close
fit to the data.
94. See generally Li-tze Hu & Peter M. Bentler, Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance
structure analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives, 6 STRUCTURAL EQUATION
MODELING: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY J. 1 (1999).
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The two-factor CFA consisted of six items loading on two factors as
previously described (and shown in Table 8). Three of the items
loaded on the dispositionally focused factor and the other three
loaded on the situationally focused factor. This model indicated c2(8)
= 25.06, p < .01, and the fit indices for this model showed a CFI of .94
and an RMSEA value of .10. Both the CFI and the RMSEA for this
model indicate that the model is a good fit for the data. Thus, I
computed the Attributional Tendency Scale (with two subscales),
which was created using those six items. The Dispositional Tendency
Subscale score was computed by averaging the three dispositionally
focused items (Chronbach’s alpha = .72; M = 4.96; SD = .96).
Similarly, the Situational Tendency Subscale score was computed by
averaging the three situationally focused items (Chronbach’s alpha =
.75; M = 4.78; SD = 1.01). These subscales were significantly
correlated, r (199) = .19, p = .01.
To test the predicted relationship between attributional tendencies
and apportionments of responsibility, I ran a regression analysis with
two predictors: (1) scores on the Dispositional Tendency Subscale and
(2) scores on the Situational Tendency Subscale. First, with the two-
predictor regression model, I determined that there was not a
significant interaction between the Dispositional Tendency and
Situational Tendency Subscales, b = -.06, p = .39. Having ruled out an
interaction effect, as predicted, both subscales were significant
predictors for apportionments of responsibility attributed to the
defendant’s driving (Dispositional Tendency Subscale: b = .15, p = .04;
Situational Tendency Subscale: b = -.20; p = .01; R2 (overall model) =
.06, p = .01; see Figure 2).
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FIGURE 2. Relationship between Dispositional Tendency Subscale
(a), Situational Tendency Subscale (b), and the Percent
Responsibility Attributed to the Defendant.
(a) (b)
Dispositional Tendency Predicting Situational Tendency Predicting
Responsibility Attributed to the Defendant Responsibility Attributed to the Defendant
This data supports the conclusion that individual differences in
Attributional Tendencies predicted some of the variability in how
participants apportioned responsibility to the defendant. In general,
participants who showed more dispositional tendencies and less
situational tendencies apportioned more responsibility to the
defendant for the harm. Thus, apportionments of responsibility vary—
at least in part—based on the individual differences of the decision-
maker.
4. The Relationship between Apportionment of Responsibility and
Damage Awards
In addition to examining how participants apportion responsibility
for harm, this study also examined the implications for awarding sev-
eral liability. One question instructed participants on the doctrine of
several liability and described the damages from the accident as being
worth about $100,000. It then asked participants to determine how
much in damages the defendant should pay. If participants are appro-
priately applying the doctrine of several liability, then the damage
award should reflect the apportionment of responsibility assigned to
the defendant. In this specific example, if participants are dividing
damages based purely on how they apportion responsibility, then for
every one percent of responsibility attributed to the defendant, he
should be responsible for an additional $1,000 in damages.
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The mean values suggest that there are proportional values. The
average percent of responsibility attributed to the defendant is
63.33% and the average damage award was $65,513.03. Additionally,
a linear regression analysis estimates the change in damage award for
each additional percent of responsibility attributed to the defendant.
Using the apportionment of responsibility of the defendant as a pre-
dictor, for every one percent increase in attribution of responsibility,
there is a corresponding $643.37 increase in damages (b = .54; p < .001;
R2 (overall model) = .29, p < .001; see Figure 3). This finding suggests
that increases in damage awards follow with increases in apportion-
ments of responsibility, but lag behind what would be expected
($1,000) if the values were lockstep.
FIGURE 3. Relationship between the Percent Responsibility
Attributed to the Defendant and Amount of Damages
the Defendant Should Pay.
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CONCLUSIONS
The United States has a rich legal history addressing how to appor-
tion responsibility between multiple negligent actors. Much of this
doctrine governs the implications of specific apportionments between
the plaintiff and defendant (or multiple defendants). However, these
doctrines leave to the jury how best to go about actually doing the
apportionment. There is no instruction manual. Nor are courts want-
ing to interfere with these jury determinations. Thus, it is useful to
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consider how the jury might be going about apportioning responsibil-
ity. The current study sought to provide some insight into how triers-
of-fact apportion responsibility.
There are a number of noteworthy findings. First, although all par-
ticipants read the same, relatively simple vignette, the apportionments
of responsibility varied widely. This highlights the vast differences in
perception that can exist in triers-of-fact even though they are ex-
posed to the same information. It also suggests the potential difficul-
ties a trier-of-fact might have in apportioning responsibility for harm.
Although, it is possible some of these differences might converge in
the jury deliberation process on some “middle ground.” However, the
high levels of variability in apportionments may be cause for some
concern regarding the equitable administration of justice.
Another noteworthy finding focuses on the influence of attribu-
tional tendencies. Participants who showed more dispositional tenden-
cies and less situational tendencies apportioned more responsibility
for the harm to the defendant. This suggests that apportionments of
responsibility vary—at least in part—based on the individual differ-
ences of the decision-maker.
Third, the study also examined the relationship between apportion-
ments of responsibility and apportionments of damages. According to
this analysis, for every one percent increase in apportionment of re-
sponsibility, the damage award followed the trend, but lagged behind
the expected increases.
The final noteworthy finding highlighted the influence of human
cognition on the apportionment of responsibility, specifically the ten-
dency to prefer values that are multiples of ten when provided a zero
to one hundred percent scale. These findings could have profound im-
plications for the distinction between the forty-nine percent and fifty
percent rules associated with modified comparative negligence. This is
in line with an observation by Schwartz, “[A]ttorneys who have prac-
ticed with some frequency under comparative negligence suggest that
jurors are inclined to return fifty/fifty verdicts which would, of course,
bar recovery under the forty-nine percent rule.”95 As written, the
forty-nine percent and fifty percent rules differ only slightly. But given
these findings, there might be significant differences in plaintiff’s abil-
ity to recover from the defendant for her harm. Plaintiffs in forty-nine
percent rule jurisdictions may be far more often precluded from re-
covering compared to the fifty percent rule.
95. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 2.01(b)(3), at 34.
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As with any empirical study, there are limitations worth discussing.
This research is based on a single vignette study with an online sam-
ple. Additional replications using other case facts and with diverse
samples (online and in-person) would allow for greater general-
izability of the findings. Further, this was not a mock jury study. As
such, it is difficult to know how the deliberation process might affect
the outcome. Future studies could use mock jury procedures with
more realistic materials mimicking a trial to increase ecological valid-
ity. Keeping these limitations in mind, this study offers initial empiri-
cal evidence suggesting that jurors might be struggling to uniformly
apportion responsibility. These results suggest that our understanding
of the application of comparative negligence would benefit from fur-
ther research examining the decision-making processes that influence
the apportionment of responsibility.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1. Contributory Negligence States
Jurisdiction Rule Authority
Rowden v. Tomlinson, 538 So.2d 15, 18 (Ala. 1988)
(stating, “The law in Alabama is quite clear that
while it is not a defense to a claim based on wantonContributoryAlabama misconduct on the part of the defendant,Negligence contributory negligence is a complete defense to an
action based on negligence. Creel v. Brown, 508
So.2d 684 (Ala. 1987).”).
Board of Cty. Comm’r of Garrett Cty. v. Bell
Atlantic, 695 A.2d 171, 180 (Md. 1997) (stating,
“[u]nder Maryland law, contributory negligence of a
plaintiff will ordinarily bar his, her, or its recovery.
Contributory negligence is that degree of reasonable
Contributory and ordinary care that a plaintiff fails to undertake inMaryland Negligence the face of an appreciable risk which cooperates with
the defendant’s negligence in bringing about the
plaintiff’s harm. Wegad v. Howard Street Jewelers,
326 Md. 409, 418, 605 A.2d 123, 128 (1992); Menish
v. Polinger Co., 277 Md. 553, 559, 356 A.2d 233, 236
(1976).”).
Clark v. Roberts, 139 S.E.2d 593, 597 (1965) (stating,
“[e]very person having the capacity to exercise
ordinary care for his own safety against injury is
Contributory required by law to do so, and if he fails to exerciseNorth Carolina Negligence such care, and such failure, concurring and
cooperating with the actionable negligence of
defendant contributes to the injury complained of,
he is guilty of contributory negligence.”).
Rose v. Jaques, 597 S.E.2d 64, 71 (2004) (stating,
“[c]ontributory negligence involves an objective test,
Contributory ‘i.e., whether a plaintiff failed to act as a reasonableVirginia Negligence person would have acted for his own safety under
the circumstances.’ Artrip v. E.E. Berry Equip. Co.,
240 Va. 354, 358, 397 S.E.2d 821, 823–24 (1990).”).
Bell v. Elite Builders, 634 Fed.Appx. 802, 803 (2015)
(stating, “[c]ontributory negligence is a complete bar
to liability for negligence under District of Columbia
law. Juvenalis v. District of Columbia, 955 A.2d 187,
District of Contributory 193 (D.C. 2008). To succeed, the defendants must
Columbia Negligence establish ‘that the plaintiff failed to exercise
reasonable care’ and ‘that this failure was a
substantial factor in causing the alleged damage or
injury.’ Massengale v. Pitts, 737 A.2d 1029, 1031
(D.C.1999).”).
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TABLE 2. Pure Comparative Negligence States
Jurisdiction Rule Authority
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.17.060 (West 2018) (“In an
action based on fault seeking to recover damages for
Pure Com- injury or death to a person or harm to property, con-
Alaska parative tributory fault chargeable to the claimant diminishes
Negligence proportionately the amount awarded as compensa-
tory damages for the injury attributable to the claim-
ant’s contributory fault, but does not bar recovery.”).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2505(A) (West 2019)
(“The defense of contributory negligence or of
assumption of risk is in all cases a question of fact
Pure Com- and shall at all times be left to the jury. If the jury
Arizona parative applies either defense, the claimant’s action is not
Negligence barred, but the full damages shall be reduced in pro-
portion to the relative degree of the claimant’s fault
which is a proximate cause of the injury or death, if
any.”).
Li v. Yellow Cab Co. 13 Cal.3d 804, 829, 523 P.2d
1226, 1246 (Cal. 1975) (stating “[I]n all actions for
negligence resulting in injury to person or property,Pure Com- the contributory negligence of the person injured inCalifornia parative person or property shall not bar recovery, but theNegligence damages awarded shall be diminished in proportion
to the amount of negligence attributable to the per-
son recovering.”).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81(2) (West 2018) (“In a neg-
ligence action, contributory fault chargeable to thePure Com- claimant diminishes proportionately the amountFlorida parative awarded as economic and noneconomic damages forNegligence an injury attributable to the claimant’s contributory
fault, but does not bar recovery.”).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.182(1)(b) (West 2019)
(“The percentage of the total fault of all the partiesPure Com- to each claim that is allocated to each claimant,Kentucky parative defendant, third-party defendant, and person whoNegligence has been released from liability under subsection (4)
of this section.”).
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2323(A) (West 2018) (“If a
person suffers injury, death, or loss as the result
partly of his own negligence and partly as a result ofPure Com- the fault of another person or persons, the amount ofLouisiana parative damages recoverable shall be reduced in proportionNegligence to the degree or percentage of negligence attributa-
ble to the person suffering the injury, death, or
loss.”).
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MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (West 2018) (“In all
actions hereafter brought for personal injuries, or
where such injuries have resulted in death, or for
injury to property, the fact that the person injured,
Pure Com- or the owner of the property, or person having con-
Mississippi parative trol over the property may have been guilty of con-
Negligence tributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but
damages shall be diminished by the jury in propor-
tion to the amount of negligence attributable to the
person injured, or the owner of the property, or the
person having control over the property.”).
Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11, 15–16 (Mo.
1983) (“Insofar as possible this and future cases shall
apply the doctrine of pure comparative fault in
accordance with the Uniform Comparative Fault Act
§§ 1–6, 12 U.L.A. Supp. 35–45 (1983).”). UNIFORM
Pure Com- COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1 [Effect of Contribu-
Missouri parative tory Fault] states, “(a) In an action based on fault
Negligence seeking to recover damages for injury or death to
person or harm to property, any contributory fault
chargeable to the claimant diminishes proportion-
ately the amount awarded as compensatory damages
for an injury attributable to the claimant’s contribu-
tory fault, but does not bar recovery.”
Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234, 1241 (N.M. 1981) (stat-
ing “[T]he plaintiff’s percentage of contributing fault
Pure Com- will reduce his recovery of total damages suffered in
New Mexico parative an amount equal to his degree of fault, at the same
Negligence time exposing him to liability to and recovery by
defendant for injuries incurred by defendant as a
result of plaintiff’s proportionate negligence.”).
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1411 (McKinney 2019) (“In any
action to recover damages for personal injury, injury
to property, or wrongful death, the culpable conduct
attributable to the claimant or to the decedent,Pure Com- including contributory negligence or assumption ofNew York parative risk, shall not bar recovery, but the amount of dam-Negligence ages otherwise recoverable shall be diminished in the
proportion which the culpable conduct attributable
to the claimant or decedent bears to the culpable
conduct which caused the damages.”).
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9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-20-4 (West 2019) (“In all
actions hereafter brought for personal injuries, or
where personal injuries have resulted in death, or for
injury to property, the fact that the person injured,
Pure Com- or the owner of the property or person having con-
Rhode Island parative trol over the property, may not have been in the
Negligence exercise of due care . . . shall not bar a recovery, but
damages shall be diminished by the finder of fact in
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable
to the person injured, or the owner of the property
or the person having control over the property.”).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.005 (West 2019) (“In
an action based on fault seeking to recover damages
for injury or death to person or harm to property,Pure Com- any contributory fault chargeable to the claimantWashington parative diminishes proportionately the amount awarded asNegligence compensatory damages for an injury attributable to
the claimant’s contributory fault, but does not bar
recovery.”).
TABLE 3. Forty-Nine Percent Rule Comparative Negligence States
Jurisdiction Rule Authority
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122(b)(1)-(2) (West 2018)
(“(1) If the fault chargeable to a party claiming dam-
ages is of a lesser degree than the fault chargeable to
the party or parties from whom the claiming party
seeks to recover damages, then the claiming party is
Forty-Nine entitled to recover the amount of his or her damages
Arkansas Percent after they have been diminished in proportion to the
Rule degree of his or her own fault. (2) If the fault charge-
able to a party claiming damages is equal to or
greater in degree than any fault chargeable to the
party or parties from whom the claiming party seeks
to recover damages, then the claiming party is not
entitled to recover such damages.”).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-111(1) (West 2019)
(“Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in
any action by any person or his legal representative
to recover damages for negligence resulting in deathForty-Nine or in injury to person or property, if such negligenceColorado Percent was not as great as the negligence of the personRule against whom recovery is sought, but any damages
allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the
amount of negligence attributable to the person for
whose injury, damage, or death recovery is made.”).
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-33(g) (West 2019) (“[T]heForty-Nine plaintiff shall not be entitled to receive any damagesGeorgia Percent if the plaintiff is 50 percent or more responsible forRule the injury or damages claimed.”).
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IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-801 (West 2019) (“Contribu-
tory negligence or comparative responsibility shall
not bar recovery in an action by any person or his
legal representative to recover damages for negli-
gence, gross negligence or comparative responsibility
Forty-Nine resulting in death or in injury to person or property,
Idaho Percent if such negligence or comparative responsibility was
Rule not as great as the negligence, gross negligence or
comparative responsibility of the person against
whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed
shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount
of negligence or comparative responsibility attributa-
ble to the person recovering.”).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(a) (West 2017) (“The
contributory negligence of a party in a civil action
does not bar that party or its legal representative
from recovering damages for negligence resulting inForty-Nine death, personal injury, property damage or economicKansas Percent loss, if that party’s negligence was less than theRule causal negligence of the party or parties against
whom a claim is made, but the award of damages to
that party must be reduced in proportion to the
amount of negligence attributed to that party.”).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (West 2019)
(“When any person suffers death or damage as a
result partly of that person’s own fault and partly of
the fault of any other person or persons, a claim in
respect of that death or damage may not be defeatedForty-Nine by reason of the fault of the person suffering theMaine Percent damage, but the damages recoverable in respectRule thereof must be reduced to such extent as the jury
thinks just and equitable having regard to the claim-
ant’s share in the responsibility for the damage. . . . If
such claimant is found by the jury to be equally at
fault, the claimant may not recover.”).
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-21, 185.09 (Reissue
2016) (“Any contributory negligence chargeable to
the claimant shall diminish proportionately the
amount awarded as damages for an injury attributa-Forty-Nine ble to the claimant’s contributory negligence butNebraska Percent shall not bar recovery, except that if the contributoryRule negligence of the claimant is equal to or greater than
the total negligence of all persons against whom
recovery is sought, the claimant shall be totally
barred from recovery.”).
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-03.2-02 (West 2019)
(“Contributory fault does not bar recovery in an
action by any person to recover damages for death
Forty-Nine or injury to person or property unless the fault was
North Dakota Percent as great as the combined fault of all other persons
Rule who contribute to the injury, but any damages
allowed must be diminished in proportion to the
amount of contributing fault attributable to the per-
son recovering.”).
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McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Tenn.
1992) (stating “[S]o long as a plaintiff’s negligence
Forty-Nine remains less than the defendant’s negligence the
Tennessee Percent plaintiff may recover; in such a case, plaintiff’s dam-
Rule ages are to be reduced in proportion to the percent-
age of the total negligence attributable to the
plaintiff.”).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-818(2) (West 2008) (“A
person seeking recovery may recover from any
defendant or group of defendants whose fault, com-Forty-Nine bined with the fault of persons immune from suit andUtah Percent nonparties to whom fault is allocated, exceeds theRule fault of the person seeking recovery prior to any
reallocation of fault made under Subsection 78B-5-
819(2).”).
TABLE 4. Fifty Percent Rule Comparative Negligence States
Jurisdiction Rule Authority
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h(b) (West 2019)
(“In causes of action based on negligence, contribu-
tory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by
any person or the person’s legal representative to
recover damages resulting from personal injury,
wrongful death or damage to property if the negli-
gence was not greater than the combined negligenceFifty PercentConnecticut of the person or persons against whom recovery isRule sought including settled or released persons under
subsection (n) of this section. The economic or
noneconomic damages allowed shall be diminished
in the proportion of the percentage of negligence
attributable to the person recovering which percent-
age shall be determined pursuant to subsection (f) of
this section.”).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8132 (West 2019) (“In all
actions brought to recover damages for negligence
which results in death or injury to person or prop-
erty, the fact that the plaintiff may have been con-
tributorily negligent shall not bar a recovery by the
Fifty Percent plaintiff or the plaintiff’s legal representative whereDelaware Rule such negligence was not greater than the negligence
of the defendant or the combined negligence of all
defendants against whom recovery is sought, but any
damages awarded shall be diminished in proportion
to the amount of negligence attributed to the plain-
tiff.”).
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HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-31(a) (West 2018)
(“Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in
any action by any person or the person’s legal repre-
sentative to recover damages for negligence resulting
in death or in injury to person or property, if such
Fifty Percent negligence was not greater than the negligence of theHawaii Rule person or in the case of more than one person, the
aggregate negligence of such persons against whom
recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be
diminished in proportion to the amount of negli-
gence attributable to the person for whose injury,
damage or death recovery is made.”).
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1116(c) (West 2019)
(“The plaintiff shall be barred from recovering dam-
ages if the trier of fact finds that the contributory
fault on the part of the plaintiff is more than 50% of
the proximate cause of the injury or damage for
which recovery is sought. The plaintiff shall not beFifty PercentIllinois barred from recovering damages if the trier of factRule finds that the contributory fault on the part of the
plaintiff is not more than 50% of the proximate
cause of the injury or damage for which recovery is
sought, but any economic or non-economic damages
allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the
amount of fault attributable to the plaintiff.”).
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-2-6(a) (West 2018) (“In an
action based on fault that is brought against: (1) one
(1) defendant; or (2) two (2) or more defendants
Fifty Percent who may be treated as a single party; the claimant isIndiana Rule barred from recovery if the claimant’s contributory
fault is greater than the fault of all persons whose
fault proximately contributed to the claimant’s dam-
ages.”).
IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.3(1)(a) (West 2019) (“Con-
tributory fault shall not bar recovery in an action by
a claimant to recover damages for fault resulting in
death or in injury to person or property unless the
claimant bears a greater percentage of fault than theFifty PercentIowa combined percentage of fault attributed to theRule defendants, third-party defendants and persons who
have been released pursuant to section 668.7, but
any damages allowed shall be diminished in propor-
tion to the amount of fault attributable to the claim-
ant.”).
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MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West 2019)
(“Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in
any action by any person or legal representative to
recover damages for negligence resulting in death or
in injury to person or property, if such negligenceFifty PercentMassachusetts was not greater than the total amount of negligenceRule attributable to the person or persons against whom
recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be
diminished in proportion to the amount of negli-
gence attributable to the person for whose injury,
damage or death recovery is made.”).
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2959 (West 2017)
(“In an action based on tort or another legal theory
seeking damages for personal injury, property dam-
age, or wrongful death, the court shall reduce the
damages by the percentage of comparative fault of
the person upon whose injury or death the damages
are based as provided in section 6306 or 6306a,1 asFifty PercentMichigan applicable. If that person’s percentage of fault isRule greater than the aggregate fault of the other person
or persons, whether or not parties to the action, the
court shall reduce economic damages by the percent-
age of comparative fault of the person upon whose
injury or death the damages are based as provided in
section 6306 or 6306a, as applicable, and
noneconomic damages shall not be awarded.”).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01(Subdivision 1) (West
2018) (“Contributory fault does not bar recovery in
an action by any person or the person’s legal repre-
sentative to recover damages for fault resulting in
Fifty Percent death, in injury to person or property, or in eco-Minnesota Rule nomic loss, if the contributory fault was not greater
than the fault of the person against whom recovery is
sought, but any damages allowed must be diminished
in proportion to the amount of fault attributable to
the person recovering.”).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-702 (West 2017) (“Con-
tributory negligence does not bar recovery in an
action by a person or the person’s legal representa-
tive to recover tort damages for negligence resulting
Fifty Percent in death or injury to a person or property if the con-Montana Rule tributory negligence was not greater than the negli-
gence of the person or the combined negligence of
all persons . . . but any damages allowed must be
diminished in the proportion to the percentage of
negligence attributable to the person recovering.”).
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NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.141(1) (West 2017) (“In
any action to recover damages for death or injury to
persons or for injury to property in which compara-
tive negligence is asserted as a defense, the compara-Fifty PercentNevada tive negligence of the plaintiff or the plaintiff’sRule decedent does not bar a recovery if that negligence
was not greater than the negligence or gross negli-
gence of the parties to the action against whom
recovery is sought.”).
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-d (West 2019) (“Con-
tributory fault shall not bar recovery in an action by
any plaintiff or plaintiff’s legal representative, to
recover damages in tort for death, personal injury or
Fifty Percent property damage, if such fault was not greater thanNew Hampshire Rule the fault of the defendant, or the defendants in the
aggregate if recovery is allowed against more than
one defendant, but the damages awarded shall be
diminished in proportion to the amount of fault
attributed to the plaintiff by general verdict.”).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West 2019) (“Contrib-
utory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action
by any person or his legal representative to recover
damages for negligence resulting in death or injury
to person or property, if such negligence was notFifty PercentNew Jersey greater than the negligence of the person againstRule whom recovery is sought or was not greater than the
combined negligence of the persons against whom
recovery is sought. Any damages sustained shall be
diminished by the percentage sustained of negli-
gence attributable to the person recovering.”).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.33 (West 2019) (“The
contributory fault of a person does not bar the per-
son as plaintiff from recovering damages that have
directly and proximately resulted from the tortious
conduct of one or more other persons, if the contrib-
utory fault of the plaintiff was not greater than the
combined tortious conduct of all other persons fromFifty PercentOhio whom the plaintiff seeks recovery in this action andRule of all other persons from whom the plaintiff does not
seek recovery in this action. The court shall diminish
any compensatory damages recoverable by the plain-
tiff by an amount that is proportionately equal to the
percentage of tortious conduct of the plaintiff as
determined pursuant to section 2315.34 of the
Revised Code.”).
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OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 13 (West 2018) (“In all
actions hereafter brought, whether arising before or
after the effective date of this act, for negligence
resulting in personal injuries or wrongful death, or
injury to property, contributory negligence shall not
bar a recovery, unless any negligence of the personFifty PercentOklahoma so injured, damaged or killed, is of greater degreeRule than any negligence of the person, firm or corpora-
tion causing such damage, or unless any negligence
of the person so injured, damaged or killed, is of
greater degree than the combined negligence of any
persons, firms or corporations causing such dam-
age.”).
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.600(1) (West 2017)
(“Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in
an action by any person or the legal representative of
the person to recover damages for death or injury to
Fifty Percent person or property if the fault attributable to theOregon Rule claimant was not greater than the combined fault of
all persons specified in subsection (2) of this section,
but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the
proportion to the percentage of fault attributable to
the claimant.”).
42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102(a) (West
2019) (“In all actions brought to recover damages for
negligence resulting in death or injury to person or
property, the fact that the plaintiff may have been
guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a
Fifty Percent recovery by the plaintiff or his legal representativePennsylvania Rule where such negligence was not greater than the
causal negligence of the defendant or defendants
against whom recovery is sought, but any damages
sustained by the plaintiff shall be diminished in pro-
portion to the amount of negligence attributed to the
plaintiff.”).
Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 399 S.E.2d 783, 784
(S.C. 1991) (stating “For all causes of action arising
on or after July 1, 1991, a plaintiff in a negligenceFifty PercentSouth Carolina action may recover damages if his or her negligenceRule is not greater than that of the defendant. The
amount of the plaintiff’s recovery shall be reduced in
proportion to the amount of his or her negligence.”).
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.001 (West
Fifty Percent 2017) (“In an action to which this chapter applies, aTexas Rule claimant may not recover damages if his percentage
of responsibility is greater than 50 percent.”).
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VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (West 2019) (“Con-
tributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an
action by any plaintiff, or his or her legal representa-
tive, to recover damages for negligence resulting in
Fifty Percent death, personal injury, or property damage, if theVermont Rule negligence was not greater than the causal total neg-
ligence of the defendant or defendants, but the dam-
age shall be diminished by general verdict in
proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to
the plaintiff.”).
W. VA. CODE § 55-7-13a(b) (West 2019) (“In any
action based on tort or any other legal theory seek-
ing damages for personal injury, property damage, or
wrongful death, recovery shall be predicated uponFifty PercentWest Virginia principles of comparative fault and the liability ofRule each person, including plaintiffs, defendants and
nonparties who proximately caused the damages,
shall be allocated to each applicable person in direct
proportion to that person’s percentage of fault.”).
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045(1) (West 2019) (“Con-
tributory negligence does not bar recovery in an
action by any person or the person’s legal represen-
tative to recover damages for negligence resulting in
Fifty Percent death or in injury to person or property, if that negli-Wisconsin Rule gence was not greater than the negligence of the per-
son against whom recovery is sought, but any
damages allowed shall be diminished in the propor-
tion to the amount of negligence attributed to the
person recovering.”).
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109(b) (West 2019) (“Con-
tributory fault shall not bar a recovery in an action
by any claimant or the claimant’s legal representa-
tive to recover damages for wrongful death or injuryFifty PercentWyoming to person or property, if the contributory fault of theRule claimant is not more than fifty percent (50%) of the
total fault of all actors. Any damages allowed shall
be diminished in proportion to the amount of fault
attributed to the claimant.”).
TABLE 5. Slight/Gross Comparative Negligence States
Jurisdiction Rule Authority
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-9-2 (West 2019) (“In all
actions brought to recover damages for injuries to a
person or to that person’s property caused by the
negligence of another, the fact that the plaintiff maySlight/Gross have been guilty of contributory negligence does notSouth Dakota Comparative bar a recovery when the contributory negligence ofNegligence the plaintiff was slight in comparison with the negli-
gence of the defendant, but in such case, the dam-
ages shall be reduced in proportion to the amount of
plaintiff’s contributory negligence.”).
